Team:Imperial College London/Human/Overview

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<p>Historically, iGEM teams have tried to control GM release via two mechanisms: complete containment and "suicide" mechanisms in which the bacteria kill themselves in the absence or presence of specific stimuli. However, when considering the eventual use of many projects – be it bioremediation (e.g. Peking 2010’s project), crop-enhancing projects (e.g. Bristol’s 2010 project) or other applications – full use of synthetic biology organisms will only be achieved by release and full containment is often not a realistic option. In addition, kill switches may be effective to an extent but they are easily selected against by evolution as they present a strong selective disadvantage. Stress defence mechanisms such as the SOS response in E coli add to this effect. In addition, transgenes can be transferred to other bacteria in the environment using naturally occurring mechanisms such as conjugation of plasmids. Finally, while it may be argued that engineered lab strains will quickly be outcompeted, bacteria with GM markers have been found in the environment more than a decade after they were released REF. In some cases, endurance of the bacteria in specific environments may even be desirable.</p>
<p>Historically, iGEM teams have tried to control GM release via two mechanisms: complete containment and "suicide" mechanisms in which the bacteria kill themselves in the absence or presence of specific stimuli. However, when considering the eventual use of many projects – be it bioremediation (e.g. Peking 2010’s project), crop-enhancing projects (e.g. Bristol’s 2010 project) or other applications – full use of synthetic biology organisms will only be achieved by release and full containment is often not a realistic option. In addition, kill switches may be effective to an extent but they are easily selected against by evolution as they present a strong selective disadvantage. Stress defence mechanisms such as the SOS response in E coli add to this effect. In addition, transgenes can be transferred to other bacteria in the environment using naturally occurring mechanisms such as conjugation of plasmids. Finally, while it may be argued that engineered lab strains will quickly be outcompeted, bacteria with GM markers have been found in the environment more than a decade after they were released REF. In some cases, endurance of the bacteria in specific environments may even be desirable.</p>
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<p>In light of these issues, we have decided to follow traditional practice by engineering a kill switch. We acknowledge that this kill switch is never going to be completely effective.  We have consulted experts and the literature about the implications of our project and used this information to design an effective kill switch. However, we also tried to address all possible problems and complications arising from the impossibility of absolute control. Accordingly, we used the information we gathered to influence our release strategy and design. </p>
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<p>In light of these issues, we have decided to follow traditional practice by engineering a containment switch. We acknowledge that this containment switch is never going to be completely effective.  We have consulted experts and the literature about the implications of our project and used this information to design an effective containment switch. However, we also tried to address all possible problems and complications arising from the impossibility of absolute control. Accordingly, we used the information we gathered to influence our release strategy and design. </p>
<p>References:
<p>References:

Revision as of 14:38, 12 August 2011



Human Practices

Historically, iGEM teams have tried to control GM release via two mechanisms: complete containment and "suicide" mechanisms in which the bacteria kill themselves in the absence or presence of specific stimuli. However, when considering the eventual use of many projects – be it bioremediation (e.g. Peking 2010’s project), crop-enhancing projects (e.g. Bristol’s 2010 project) or other applications – full use of synthetic biology organisms will only be achieved by release and full containment is often not a realistic option. In addition, kill switches may be effective to an extent but they are easily selected against by evolution as they present a strong selective disadvantage. Stress defence mechanisms such as the SOS response in E coli add to this effect. In addition, transgenes can be transferred to other bacteria in the environment using naturally occurring mechanisms such as conjugation of plasmids. Finally, while it may be argued that engineered lab strains will quickly be outcompeted, bacteria with GM markers have been found in the environment more than a decade after they were released REF. In some cases, endurance of the bacteria in specific environments may even be desirable.

In light of these issues, we have decided to follow traditional practice by engineering a containment switch. We acknowledge that this containment switch is never going to be completely effective. We have consulted experts and the literature about the implications of our project and used this information to design an effective containment switch. However, we also tried to address all possible problems and complications arising from the impossibility of absolute control. Accordingly, we used the information we gathered to influence our release strategy and design.

References:

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