On the 21st of August, 2011, the St Andrews iGEM team collaborated with the Dundee iGEM Team and John Urch of Revealing Research Dundee to organise a synthetic biology panel debate at the World Schools Debating Championships in Dundee. The World Schools Debating Championships (WSDC) is a celebrated debating competition between high school students of various cultures and academic backgrounds, which has been taking place annually since 1988. Previous participants of the competition have included Tony Blair.

Our preliminary idea was to conduct a presentation which would inform students about synthetic biology and would inspire a healthy discussion concerning the various ethical issues and opinions associated with the subject. The teams had a few meetings prior to the event where the programme of the presentation and the division of responsibilities were discussed. It was decided that the Dundee iGEM team would talk about the positive aspects of synthetic biology, while the St Andrews iGEM team would discuss the negative aspects of synthetic biology. After the presentation, both iGEM teams and their advisors would form a panel to address questions raised by audience members, in order to encourage independent thought and internal discussion amongst the audience.

Our Arguments

The Dundee iGEM team began the discussion by introducing the concept of synthetic biology and discussing their iGEM project. They explained the basic principles of iGEM, the concept of a biobrick, and how it affects the activities of the overall cell. They began their discussion of the benefits of synthetic biology by introducing the role particular biobrick sequences could play in the treatment of disease. Dundee mentioned examples of ongoing scientific projects such as the effect of using various biobricks to synthesize pharmaceuticals treat malaria and diabetes. But the use of biobrick sequences extend further than simply medical applications. Synthetic biology can also help to produce greener fuels, such as bio-alcohol or photosynthetic algae, which are becoming increasingly popular due to the changes in the world’s climate and increasing dependence on fossil fuels. Dundee introduced the idea that synthetic biology could be used in controlling and reducing the spread of oil spills, by creating bacteria that are able to metabolize oil, enabling them to be utilized in the cleanup effort. Novel ideas like this open the door for synthetic biology to play an important role in environmental protection. Other applications of synthetic biology include material production, such as cellular production of fertilizers and pesticides that could help to boost agricultural growth, or chemicals that require non-cost-effective human effort to synthesize. It seemed as though synthetic biology could solve some of the most prominent problems of our time.

Following the Dundee iGEM presentation was the St Andrews iGEM Team, who discussed the negative aspects of synthetic biology. St Andrews chose to highlight three main practical dangers of synthetic biology, including how best to prevent these disasters from occurring in the future.

St Andrews introduced the concept of bioterrorism within a synthetic biology context. Whilst one of the best things about the synthetic biology community is its largely open-source approach, this also means that anyone with the appropriate equipment and skills (which are widely available) could assemble a virulent strain of bacteria/virus - we highlighted for example the assembly of Polio from mail order oligonucleotides [Cello et al. 2007]. Another practical danger is the prospect of an organism escaping the lab and being released into the surrounding environment. The danger here is two-fold, with the bacteria either colonizing an individual or individuals, potentially causing serious bodily harm and even death, or the bacteria colonizing the environment, causing damage to the environmental niche, or out-competing other natural flora into extinction. The last practical danger is the need for scientists to test synthetic bacteria in an open environment. Whilst some applications such as creation of pharmaceuticals could be done entirely in the laboratory, other projects such as the Arsenic sensor that was produced by another iGEM team would inherently need to be released into the field to realize their application. The fear here is that the potential exists during tests for bacteria to become endemic to the environment, colonizing rapidly and making eradication of the bacteria all but impossible. After colonization, similar problems to the “escape the lab” scenario occur, including environmental damage or infection of animals or humans.

While these issues seem worrying, they were introduced alongside how best they could be prevented, in order to show the audience that while there are dangers associated with synthetic biology, the protection of the public at large is paramount in the minds of scientists worldwide. The threat of bioterrorism is greatly reduced upon the realization of the resources required to synthesize and grow a bacteria or virus are vast, and not easily obtainable. These range from chemicals used to retain the virus’ virulence during storage, to a dispersal mechanism for pathogen release, and finally, serious financial backing and access to a full biomolecular laboratory. The risk of colonization by released synthetic organisms is not as daunting a fear after the understanding that genetically-engineered microorganisms are usually less evolutionarily fit than their naturally-occurring counterparts. Strict laboratory protocols, transportation procedures, and even cell-level safeguards, such as the kill switch St Andrews iGEM has built, can be utilized to help reduce the chance of widespread colonization.

Student Response

Presentations

Below are links to both the St Andrews and Dundee University presentations:

Presentation - University of Dundee (Benefits of Synthetic Biology) THIS NEEDS EDITING.

Presentation - University of St Andrews (Deficits of Synthetic Biology) THIS NEEDS EDITING.

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