The iGEM Safety Form asks us as students to think about our projects in a biosafety context. What would happen if our bacteria were to escape from the lab? How would species, ecosystems, or even individuals be affected by the genetically engineered microorganisms (GEM) we are creating? These are incredibly important questions that need to be answered in order to ensure a safe and well-protected laboratory environment.

If a GEM is accidentally or purposefully released from a lab, there may potentially be devastating consequences. The fear is that bacteria will escape and colonize outside of the lab, replicating beyond human control. Once colonized, GEMs may become endemic to that area, upsetting the balance of natural flora by either out-competing species to extinction, directly damaging species, or potentially harming the ecosystem itself. As described by Tucker and Zilinskas:

“If a synthetic microorganism is built by combining these genetic elements in a new way, it will lack a clear genetic pedigree and could have “emergent properties” arising from the complex interactions of its constituent genes...including its possible spread into new ecological niches and the evolution of novel and potentially harmful characteristics.” (Tucker et. al, 2006)

Despite the fact that GEMs are generally considered less fit than their wild-type counterparts, the chance of colonization outside the lab is still one which is prevalent in the minds of concerned biologists, the general public, as well as “watchdog organizations” such as GeneWatch UK. It is also important to understand that lab security is not, and will never be, perfect. While there have been no reported GEM outbreaks in the past, synthetic biology is a rising field of study, and for the sake of the public safety, as well as the image of synthetic biology as a helpful and important scientific discipline, the time to ensure procedures are safe is now.

We believe that our kill switch tool could be utilized to better ensure that a widespread outbreak of GEMs does not occur. Post-release, a GEM would need to find a food source and an environment in which it can replicate and grow safely. Inserting our kill switch tool into the plasmids of bacteria would allow for scientists to breathe easy, knowing that if a GEM were to be released into the open world, upon contact with, for instance, the GEMs preferable niche environment, intracellular AMP production would be initiated, and the bacteria would subsequently die, nullifying the chance of colonization.

Part of the brilliance behind this idea is that inducing the kill switch is entirely up the science of the project and the scientists involved. Intracellular AMP production could be induced by as specific or as broad a niche as fits the parameters of the experiment. Obviously, too specific a niche reduces the chances of the anti-colonization effect occurring, and too broad a niche may lead to accidental cell death, but there is certainly a wide breadth in between those two scenarios. By changing the promoter attached to the protegrin-1 gene, what induces AMP production could be entirely up to whatever safety committee would be in charge of lab security. This could range from contact with chemicals in local water supplies, certain foodstuffs, even specific species of animal, including, but not limited to, humans. These details could be based off the specifics of the bacteria in question (including its preferred ecological niche, known intracellular chemical pathways, , etc.) or the environment into which it may colonize (such as various chemical stimuli, food the bacteria may encounter, even temperature), creating a metaphorical safety net which is stronger than any broad-spectrum protection available today.

Not only would it be effective, the kill switch is simple to implement as well. Inserting the AMP gene is as easy as ligating it to a plasmid backbone, and if needed, it can later be removed via miniprepping the plasmid and digesting out the gene. Subsequent replication of these cells would allow for an entire colony of GEMs to have an inducible kill switch that would ensure colonization outside the lab would not occur. The protegrin-1 coding region is only 54 base pairs long, making it cheap, affordable, and readily synthesizable by any DNA laboratory. Also, the 18-residue protein is small enough that it will fold in vivo without the requirement of chaperone proteins.****

References:

Tucker, Jonathan and Zilinskas, Raymond. “The Promises and Perils of Synthetic Biology”. The New Atlantis, Number 12, Spring 2006. pgs. 25-45 http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-promise-and-perils-of-synthetic-biology