"
Team:Peking R/HumanPractice/Investigation3
From 2011.igem.org
Template:Https://2011.igem.org/Team:Peking R/bannerhidden Template:Https://2011.igem.org/Team:Peking R/back2 Template:Https://2011.igem.org/Team:Peking R/Humanpracticebackground <!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
Investigation of Antibiotic Use and
Related Biosafety Issues: What's
happening out there and further.
In the final part of our survey, we try to look at the attitudes towards possible approaches to ensure biosafety related to ARB. Most respondents chose to employ proper procedures for processing used microbes in the laboratory rather than use special plasmids that minimize HGT(Q12). This is in fact a more rational choice as adopting special plasmids may lower researchers’ awareness of HGT and give rise to new threats. As to whether the government should implement new policies to regulate the processing of used ARB, most agreed, but some showed opposition(Q13) contending that it might be troublesome in determining the details and that still it would be difficult to make the policies work: the government is unlikely supervise the treatment of RAB every minute. Besides, we also wander whether the government will run the risk of impeding research progress by heavily punishing laboratories for violating these policies.
Question 12
Question 13
In conclusion, we would like to say that the regulation of antibiotics and ARB use is a matter much more complex than previously estimated. First of all, it is hard to accurately predict what exactly happens after HGT takes place, i.e., whether HGT confers the environment with genes that are useful or harmful to humans. Second, the establishment of regulations on ARB use and waste processing in different countries and regions will certainly encounter obstacles due to several concerns including financial support. Third, even if detailed and strict procedures are established, laboratories may not be able to discipline themselves and adhere to the standards. As we have seen above, the problem lies not in the understanding, but rather in the attitudes and determination to fight against the abuse and careless treatment of ARB. Besides, as current trends imply that an increasing number of participants without professional backgrounds in biology are involved in synthetic biology research, more challenges are posed to the insurance of biosafety. Professional researchers themselves may not strictly adhere to laboratory rules and restrictions, let alone non-professional participants.
However, nothing should become a reason for us not to battle against the public health hazards caused by ARB. We cannot afford to wait for greater outbreaks of superbugs or antibiotic-resistant pathogen infections before we build up our defense. We strongly suggest that special agencies or departments funded by the government be set up to collect and process used ARB in the laboratory. Laboratories should make it a rule to separate all used microbes and materials that have been in direct contact with bacteria or their DNA/RNA from other waste and hand them over to the ARB processing agency. They may also process waste by themselves, but must ensure that all of them are sterilized or treated with strong digestive solutions to break up the antibiotic resistance genes.
