Team:Queens Canada/Safety/Bioterrorism

Safety to both iGEM researchers and the general public has been a concept stressed throughout iGEM 2011. When examining biobricks, teams are encouraged to question the possibilities of potential misuse and the threat to security. A common argument is that researchers, such as iGEM participants, cannot be responsible for the modification of their biobricks for malicious misuse or the general approach to making synthetic biology more accessible.

Our 2011 team was interested in exploring the possibilities of potential misuse in much greater detail. As a new approach to human practices, we examined the threat of, and response to, synthetic biology under malicious intent, or bioterrorism.

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Tiger Team

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Design and Production of Countermeasures

The antiBT task force should design and produce a variety of bioterrorism countermeasures. First, there are the standard countermeasures to a biological attack, vaccines and antibiotics. Anthrax and smallpox are thought to be the most likely candidates for use in a bioterrorist attack [3]. So, a sufficient stockpile of vaccinia virus vaccine (for smallpox) and anthrax vaccine adsorbed (AVA) to immunize a significant portion of the population would be ideal. Also, there should be sufficient cyprofloxin and doxycycline (anthrax antibiotics) to administer to all victims of a bioterrorist attack. Currently, Canada’s stockpile of such vaccines and antibiotics may not be sufficient to deal with all victims of a bioterrorist incident. It may be necessary for the antiBT task force to pioneer more efficient ways to make the vaccines and antibiotics.

New techniques might involve synthetic biology, which has been used by Ro and colleagues to cheaply, efficiently, and quickly produce the antimalarial drug artemisinin [4]. E. coli were equipped with heterologous enzymes from the bacterium S. cerevisiae, which enabled the E. coli to produce artemisinic acid, an immediate precursor of artemisinin, from acetyl-CoA. Acetyl-CoA is a TCA cycle intermediate produced naturally by E. coli. In traditional organic synthesis, the products of each synthetic step have to be isolated and purified before the beginning of the next step. A key advantage of an engineered bacterial chassis is that isolation and purification are unnecessary. Also, the conventional approach to isolating artemisinin from its natural producer, the Artemisia annua plant, is rate-limited by the availability of the plant. Bacterial production of artemisinin, by contrast, is limited by a facility’s capacity to produce E. coli, which is much less expensive than A. annua. The antiBT task force should pursue similar metabolic engineering approaches for the development of antibiotics for anthrax and other pathogens.

Another issue with stockpiling is that vaccines and antibiotics will eventually expire, requiring constant replenishment. It would be useful for the antiBT task force to develop a better system for storing vaccines to increase their longevity. Alternatively, it may be a better idea to design an apparatus capable of quickly producing a large quantity of vaccine. This system would not be used except in the wake of a bioterrorist attack. Such a system would eliminate the problem of expiry and ensure that no vaccine is produced wastefully. An apparatus based on engineered E. coli cells might have the capacity to produce vaccines and antibiotics quickly and flexibly.

Dealing with Increased Antibiotic Resistance

Surveillance

Education of the Medical Community

Creating a Detailed Response Plan

Determination of Intent

Analysis of Pathogen

Vaccine/Antibiotic Distribution