Team:Peking R/HumanPractice

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   <p class="notbookmaintitle">  Investigation of Antibiotic Use and</p>
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   <p class="notbookmaintitle">  &nbsp;  Review of Antibiotic Use and Potential Harms</p>
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  <p class="notbookmaintitle"> Related Biosafety Issues: What's </p>
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  <p class="notbookmaintitle">happening out there and further.  </p>
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   <p class="clickteam">In order to investigate the extent to which laboratories understand biosafety issues in regard to antibiotic use, we have carried out a  survey involving about 150 participants (including  researchers from laboratories in the College of Life sciences and College of  Chemistry and Molecular Engineering in Peking University, and employees at a  few sequencing companies) who responded to a series of questions related with treatment of antibiotic-resistant bacteria in the  laboratory. (For the majority of the participants, who are non-English  speakers, a Chinese version of the questionnaire was provided so that  difficulties in understanding survey questions were minimized.)<br />
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   <p class="clickteam"><span class="clickteam">Since their discovery, antibiotics have been considered as the primary solution to most infectious diseases and  have saved billions of lives. However, the abuse of antibiotics, combined with the widespread use of antibiotic resistance genes as selection markers, have lead to a worldwide hazard to public health - bacterial antibiotic resistance. It has become much easier to find antibiotic-resistant bacteria around us<a href="#r1">[1]</a>Increasing reports regarding superbugs - bacteria that are resistant to most common antibiotics - is also raising public concern. They have posed great threats to public health by increasing the possibilities of infectious disease outbreaks, such as the recent <em>E</em>.<em>coli</em> outbreak in Europe a few months  ago. <em>E.U</em>. has reported 25,000 deaths  caused by bacterial infection, which has even outsmarted newly invented  antibiotics<a href="#r2">[2]</a>. (See <a href="http://blogs.nature.com/news/2011/06/europes_e_coli_outbreak_time_f.html">http://blogs.nature.com/news/2011/06/europes_e_coli_out-break_time_f.html</a> for a full version of the report) It  is widely believed that the abuse of antibiotics accounts for the spread of  antibiotic-resistant bacteria. However, the fact that laboratory work also  significantly contributes to this process cannot be ignored. Our Human Practice  focuses on the treatment of used or excessive antibiotic-resistant bacteria,  and discusses feasible precautions against the spread of antibiotic-resistant microbes.</span></p>
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    According to the responses given by the  number of participants who have responded, it may be concluded that, in general, laboratory researchers are aware of potential safety issues related  with the use of antibiotic and resistance genes, but the level of awareness is far from sufficient for restricting laboratory work in a way that minimizes  possible hazards as a consequence of microbes’ antibiotic resistance.<br />
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  <p class="clickteam"><span class="clickteam">Inappropriate use of  antibiotics is a major cause of bacterial antibiotic resistance. The public  used to depend on antibiotics to treat infections regardless of whether they  are of viral origins or may be treated by means other than antibiotics. To make  matters worse, in many countries, the public has access to antibiotics without  prescriptions. As the public does not strictly follow instructions at all times,  bacterial antibiotic resistance is further aggravated. The challenge in  confronting antibiotic resistance lies in the possibility that even if antibiotic use is reduced, resistant clones would remain  persistent and cannot be rapidly outcompeted by their susceptible relatives<a href="#r3">[3]</a>. </span></p>
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    The first few questions look into the extent to which  antibiotics and antibiotic-resistant bacteria (ARB) are employed in laboratory  research. It may be seen that over eighty percent of laboratories use ARB for at least half of their experiments (Q2), and that approximately one fifth of them use bacteria with multi-antibiotic resistance (Q3). Therefore, there exists a large pool of antibiotic resistance that is foreseeable threats to the  environment.<br />
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  Question 2</p>
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     Besides treatment of  infections, antibiotics are also widely used in agriculture, where they are  added to food for animals to prevent infectious diseases and promote growth. It is relatively more difficult for the public, however, to establish the correlation between antibiotic use on farm animals and potential hazards to  public health. Despite the lack of statistical data confirming the scale of  antibiotic use, it is reasonable to estimate that the majority of antibiotics and related products are used in agriculture for their cheapness and safety to  livestock. Besides, it is also unlikely that farmers will carefully control the dosage of antibiotics applied to animals. Consequentially, excessive amounts of  antibiotics selects for bacteria with stronger resistance, and the related genes may be transferred to other microbes through horizontal gene transfer<a href="#r4">[4]</a>which may then pose greater challenges to biosafety.<br />
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  <p class="clickteam"><img src="../../human practice/PwekingR hp Q2.png" width="500" height="282" hspace="50" /></p>
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    One of the primary goals of synthetic biology is to render the design of biological systems easier for more researchers to take part in the design process. Great efforts have been made to develop toolkits which are easy and convenient for users without professional backgrounds in biology<a href="#r1">[5]</a>. The extensive use of such  toolboxes has attracted researchers from other disciplines such as engineering and computer sciences, contributing cross-disciplinary skills and techniques to conventional biological sciences. However, the participation of researchers lacking systematic training in biosafety inevitably increases the risk of  biohazards, including:</span></p>
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  Question 3</p>
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    1. High possibility that in the near future organizations of  non-research origins will be able to   produce recombinant or mutant species in a large scale, probably  threatening the environment and public safety.<br />
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  <p class="clickteam"><img src="../../human practice/PekingR hp Q3.png" width="500" height="385" hspace="50" /><br />
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     2. Improper treatment of microbes and corresponding DNA  fragments in the laboratory by researchers unaware of biosafety.</span></p>
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  </p>
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  <p class="clickteam"><span class="clickteam"> Researchers,  being too familiar with antibiotic-resistant bacteria to treat them with  caution, may also negatively affect public safety even if they have indeed  undergone professional training in biosafety. Common treatments, such as  pouring solutions or medium containing microbes into the sewer or throwing them into garbage cans, may expose antibiotic-resistant bacteria to the environment,  increasing the risk of transferring antibiotic-resistant genes to wildtype  microbes. A more subtle form of risk is the ever wider application of  Polymerase Chain Reaction(PCR), which allows microbial DNA fragments to be  rapidly replicated and promotes formation of mutant or recombinant DNA via  error-prone replication<a href="#r6">[6]</a>.
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        A.Mostly    multi-antibiotic resistant(2.56%) </td>
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  <p class="July">reference:</p>
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      <td width="38"><p>&nbsp;</p></td>
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  <p>[1]<a name="r1" id="r1"></a>1.  Livermore, D.M. Has the era of untreatable infections arrived? <em>J. Antimicrob.  Chemother</em> <strong>64 </strong>(suppl 1), i29–36 (2009). <br />
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    </tr>
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     [2].<a name="r2" id="r2"></a> As <em>E. coli </em>Outbreak Recedes, New Questions Come to the Fore. <em>Science</em> <strong>333</strong>, 27 (2011).<br />
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    <tr>
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    [3]. <a name="r3" id="r3"></a>Andersson, D.I., and Hughes, D., Persistence of antibiotic resistance in  bacterial populations. <em>FEMS Microbiol Rev</em>(2011).<em>­</em>(Accepted Article)<br />
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      <td width="359" nowrap="nowrap"><p align="left" class="clickteam">B.Half    are multi-antibiotic resistant(17.95%)</p></td>
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     [4].<a name="r4" id="r4"></a> Wiedenbeck, J., and Cohan, F.M., Origins of Bacterial Diversity through Horizontal Genetic Transfer and Adaptation to New Ecological Niches. <em>FEMS Microbiol Rev</em>(2011).<em>­</em>(Accepted Article) <br />
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      <td width="38"><p>&nbsp;</p></td>
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     [5].<a name="r5" id="r5"></a> Schmidt, M., Diffusion of synthetic biology: a challenge to biosafety. <em>Syst Synth Biol</em> <strong>2</strong>, 1–6 (2008).<br />
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    </tr>
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    [6].<a name="r6" id="r6"></a> Bügl, H., Danner, J.P., Molinari, R.J., Mulligan, J.T., Park, H., Bas Reichert, Roth, D.A., Wagner, R., Budowle, B., Scripp, R.M., Smith, J.A.L., Steele, S.J., Church, G., and Endy, D., DNA Synthesis and Biological Security. <em>Nat Biotech</em> <strong>25</strong>, 627-629 (2007).</p>
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      <td width="397" nowrap="nowrap" colspan="2"><p align="left" class="clickteam">C.Only    a few are multi-antibiotic resistant(46.15%)</p></td>
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      <td width="359" nowrap="nowrap"><p align="left" class="clickteam">D.Almost    none(33.33%)</p></td>
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  <p class="clickteam">The  next set of questions investigates whether used or unwanted ARB is  appropriately processed in laboratories.<br />
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     The  respondents all showed adequate levels of understanding in issues concerning possible threats induced by abandoned ARB in the laboratory. Almost equal proportions of respondents pointed out one of the four major consequencesrespectively(Q9). Unfortunately, statistics revealed that over one third of the respondents reported that used ARB is never or only occasionally processed in safe and professional ways, and that a considerable portion of them has no special attention paid to the issue (Q5). Besides, results for Question 6 indicated that very few (&lt;3%) laboratory researchers have been clearly informed of how  laboratory waste should be processed in their department/organization. Even if  they have somehow been informed, they did not pay much attention because they believed that laboratory waste is being appropriately processed. It is interesting that  though people know that something like this may have negative effect on our  life, they believe that there will be someone else to be responsible for such  things. To make matters worse, more than half of the laboratories directly dispose of materials that have been in direct contact with microbes, while some  others care little about the matter (Q8). This further adds to the potential danger of pollution and transfer of antibiotic resistance to microbes in the environment. Thus it seems that what is more urgent is not informing researchers of potential safety hazards of ARB but how to strictly and  effectively regulate laboratory procedures to prevent these hazards. Most researchers  know the consequences of their behavior, but few would take the time and effort to implement the right measures, probably because public health and environment have not yet experienced crises of sufficiently alarming levels, which we strongly wish, of course, to avoid.<br />
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  Question 5</p>
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   <p class="clickteam"><img src="../../human practice/PekingR hp Q5.png" width="500" height="426" hspace="50" /><br />
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        A.Almost    always discard directly or pour into sewage(15.91%) </td>
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      <td width="521" nowrap="nowrap"><p align="left" class="clickteam">B.Usually    discard directly and occasionally process them properly(22.73%)</p></td>
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      <td width="521" nowrap="nowrap"><p align="left" class="clickteam">C.Usually    process them properly but occasionally discard directly(21.59%)</p></td>
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      <td width="521" nowrap="nowrap"><p align="left" class="clickteam">D.Always    properly process them separately with other waste(23.86%)</p></td>
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      <td width="521" nowrap="nowrap"><p align="left" class="clickteam">E.No    special attention has been paid(15.91%)</p></td>
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  <p class="clickteam">Question 6</p>
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  <p class="clickteam"><img src="../../human practice/PekingR hp Q6.png" width="500" height="253" hspace="50" /><br />
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    <br />
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    Question 8</p>
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  <p class="clickteam"><img src="../../human practice/PekingR hp Q8.png" width="500" height="360" hspace="50" /><br />
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    Question 9</p>
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  <p class="clickteam"><img src="../../human practice/PekingR hp Q9.png" width="590" height="394" /><br />
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    In the final part of our survey, we  try to look at the attitudes towards possible approaches to ensure biosafety  related to ARB. Most respondents chose to employ proper procedures for  processing used microbes in the laboratory rather than use special plasmids  that minimize HGT(Q12). This is in fact a more rational choice as adopting special plasmids may lower researchers’ awareness of HGT and give rise to new threats. As to whether the government should implement new policies to regulate  the processing of used ARB, most agreed, but some showed opposition(Q13) contending that it might be troublesome in determining the details and that  still it would be difficult to make the policies work: the government is  unlikely supervise the treatment of RAB every minute. Besides, we also wander  whether the government will run the risk of impeding research progress by heavily  punishing laboratories for violating these policies.<br />
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    Question 12<br />
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     <img src="../../human practice/PekingR hp Q12.png" width="500" height="261" hspace="50" /><br />
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    Question 13</p>
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    In conclusion, we would like to say  that the regulation of antibiotics and ARB use is a matter much more complex  than previously estimated. First of all, it is hard to accurately predict what  exactly happens after HGT takes place, i.e., whether HGT confers the  environment with genes that are useful or harmful to humans. Second, the  establishment of regulations on ARB use and waste processing in different  countries and regions will certainly encounter obstacles due to several  concerns including financial support. Third, even if detailed and strict  procedures are established, laboratories may not be able to discipline  themselves and adhere to the standards. As we have seen above, the problem lies not in the understanding, but rather in the attitudes and determination to  fight against the abuse and careless treatment of ARB. Besides, as current  trends imply that an increasing number of participants without professional  backgrounds in biology are involved in synthetic biology research, more  challenges are posed to the insurance of biosafety. Professional researchers  themselves may not strictly adhere to laboratory rules and restrictions, let  alone non-professional participants.<br />
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    However, nothing  should become a reason for us not to battle against the public health hazards  caused by ARB. We cannot afford to wait for greater outbreaks of superbugs or antibiotic-resistant pathogen infections before we build up our defense. We  strongly suggest that special agencies or departments funded by the government  be set up to collect and process used ARB in the laboratory. Laboratories  should make it a rule to separate all used microbes and materials that have  been in direct contact with bacteria or their DNA/RNA from other waste and hand  them over to the ARB processing agency. They may also process waste by  themselves, but must ensure that all of them are sterilized or treated with strong digestive solutions to break up the antibiotic resistance genes.</p>
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Revision as of 16:54, 19 September 2011

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  Review of Antibiotic Use and Potential Harms


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Since their discovery, antibiotics have been considered as the primary solution to most infectious diseases and have saved billions of lives. However, the abuse of antibiotics, combined with the widespread use of antibiotic resistance genes as selection markers, have lead to a worldwide hazard to public health - bacterial antibiotic resistance. It has become much easier to find antibiotic-resistant bacteria around us[1]. Increasing reports regarding superbugs - bacteria that are resistant to most common antibiotics - is also raising public concern. They have posed great threats to public health by increasing the possibilities of infectious disease outbreaks, such as the recent E.coli outbreak in Europe a few months ago. E.U. has reported 25,000 deaths caused by bacterial infection, which has even outsmarted newly invented antibiotics[2]. (See http://blogs.nature.com/news/2011/06/europes_e_coli_out-break_time_f.html for a full version of the report) It is widely believed that the abuse of antibiotics accounts for the spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria. However, the fact that laboratory work also significantly contributes to this process cannot be ignored. Our Human Practice focuses on the treatment of used or excessive antibiotic-resistant bacteria, and discusses feasible precautions against the spread of antibiotic-resistant microbes.

Inappropriate use of antibiotics is a major cause of bacterial antibiotic resistance. The public used to depend on antibiotics to treat infections regardless of whether they are of viral origins or may be treated by means other than antibiotics. To make matters worse, in many countries, the public has access to antibiotics without prescriptions. As the public does not strictly follow instructions at all times, bacterial antibiotic resistance is further aggravated. The challenge in confronting antibiotic resistance lies in the possibility that even if antibiotic use is reduced, resistant clones would remain persistent and cannot be rapidly outcompeted by their susceptible relatives[3].


Besides treatment of infections, antibiotics are also widely used in agriculture, where they are added to food for animals to prevent infectious diseases and promote growth. It is relatively more difficult for the public, however, to establish the correlation between antibiotic use on farm animals and potential hazards to public health. Despite the lack of statistical data confirming the scale of antibiotic use, it is reasonable to estimate that the majority of antibiotics and related products are used in agriculture for their cheapness and safety to livestock. Besides, it is also unlikely that farmers will carefully control the dosage of antibiotics applied to animals. Consequentially, excessive amounts of antibiotics selects for bacteria with stronger resistance, and the related genes may be transferred to other microbes through horizontal gene transfer[4], which may then pose greater challenges to biosafety.
One of the primary goals of synthetic biology is to render the design of biological systems easier for more researchers to take part in the design process. Great efforts have been made to develop toolkits which are easy and convenient for users without professional backgrounds in biology[5]. The extensive use of such toolboxes has attracted researchers from other disciplines such as engineering and computer sciences, contributing cross-disciplinary skills and techniques to conventional biological sciences. However, the participation of researchers lacking systematic training in biosafety inevitably increases the risk of biohazards, including:


1. High possibility that in the near future organizations of non-research origins will be able to  produce recombinant or mutant species in a large scale, probably threatening the environment and public safety.
2. Improper treatment of microbes and corresponding DNA fragments in the laboratory by researchers unaware of biosafety.

Researchers, being too familiar with antibiotic-resistant bacteria to treat them with caution, may also negatively affect public safety even if they have indeed undergone professional training in biosafety. Common treatments, such as pouring solutions or medium containing microbes into the sewer or throwing them into garbage cans, may expose antibiotic-resistant bacteria to the environment, increasing the risk of transferring antibiotic-resistant genes to wildtype microbes. A more subtle form of risk is the ever wider application of Polymerase Chain Reaction(PCR), which allows microbial DNA fragments to be rapidly replicated and promotes formation of mutant or recombinant DNA via error-prone replication[6].

 


reference:

[1]1. Livermore, D.M. Has the era of untreatable infections arrived? J. Antimicrob. Chemother 64 (suppl 1), i29–36 (2009).
[2]. As E. coli Outbreak Recedes, New Questions Come to the Fore. Science 333, 27 (2011).
[3]. Andersson, D.I., and Hughes, D., Persistence of antibiotic resistance in bacterial populations. FEMS Microbiol Rev(2011).­(Accepted Article)
[4]. Wiedenbeck, J., and Cohan, F.M., Origins of Bacterial Diversity through Horizontal Genetic Transfer and Adaptation to New Ecological Niches. FEMS Microbiol Rev(2011).­(Accepted Article)
[5]. Schmidt, M., Diffusion of synthetic biology: a challenge to biosafety. Syst Synth Biol 2, 1–6 (2008).
[6]. Bügl, H., Danner, J.P., Molinari, R.J., Mulligan, J.T., Park, H., Bas Reichert, Roth, D.A., Wagner, R., Budowle, B., Scripp, R.M., Smith, J.A.L., Steele, S.J., Church, G., and Endy, D., DNA Synthesis and Biological Security. Nat Biotech 25, 627-629 (2007).