Security

Resources

People

• Piers Millet
• BWC ISU
• bwc@unog.ch
• www.unog.ch/bwc

The BWC ISU is the closest thing to an international organisation to ensure biology is used solely for beneficial purposes. It is housed in the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs in Geneva and, as Deputy Head, Piers helps States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention ban the hostile use of biology. As a microbiologist and chartered biologist, Piers supports the technical aspects of the ISU's work.

Reports and Publications

Other Resources

This is a 30 minute video arguing why we need to secure synthetic biology. It was filmed at SB4.0 in Hong Kong in 2008. It includes a short quiz that demonstrates how hard it is to spot the use of biology for hostile purposes. It looks at some of the problems with trying to secure biology through top-down governmental approaches and the need to find a community-based response to this shared problem.

Scientific research continues to bring us new and unexpected knowledge, technologies and approaches. Synthetic biology, with its questioning of what is possible, could bring exciting opportunities for health, wealth and better living. But science and technology can be used for destructive purposes as well as for constructive ones. Refining our control of biology opens up chances to intentionally cause harm to humans, animals, plants and the environment that just did not exist before. That’s why it is important now, more than ever, for us to think about how others might use what we are doing in ways we would not be happy with.

Here you will find some important resource material to think about how security issues relates to your project, iGEM and modern biology.

World Health Organization, Biorisk Management - Laboratory Biosecurity Guidance	World Health Organization, Responsible Life Science Research for Global Health Security	National Research Council, Understanding Biosecurity

Ensuring that biology is used safely, securely and constructively should be of concern to us all. This is a challenge we will have to face together. To do this we will need to figure out what we want biological engineering to look like, what we are prepared for others to do with it, and just how we want to tackle security issues. This page provides a space to focus on these issues and for you to help shape what should be done to stop those with a malign intent. There is a real opportunity here for iGEM and those participating in iGEM, not only to shape how they will deal with security issues but to drive their national and even international processes. You can make a real difference in securing biology – in your lab, in your country and across the world.

Here are a few examples of the sorts of projects and approaches that might help you deal with these issues:

Tumpey et al, Characterization of the Reconstructed 1918 Spanish Influenza, Science, 310 (5745), 7 October 2005	Kaiser, Resurrected Influenza Virus Yields Secrets of Deadly 1918 Pandemic, Science, 310 (5745), 7 October 2005	Sharp, 1918 Flu and Responsible Science, Science, 310 (5745), 7 October 2005

The VT-ENSIMAG Biosecurity team from 2010 focused their efforts on a security related bioinformatics project. They succeeded in creating screening software to identify uniquely related to agents of concern (pathogens and toxins). The team then used the screening software to show that virtually no parts in the registry came from such agents. The single part that was identified had already been clearly labelled as coming from a pathogen. This project demonstrated that security and science can be mutually beneficial and how effectively iGEM has engaged in these areas. For their work, VT-ENSIMAG Biosecurity won a special award in safety and security.

The PKU Beijing team in 2009, as its human practices project, conducted a survey of 17 biotech supply companies to see if they would deliver a variety of laboratory resources to a domestic address. The PKU Beijing team in 2009, as its human practices project, conducted a survey of 17 biotech supply companies to see if they would deliver a variety of laboratory resources to a domestic address. The team discovered that many of the companies they contacted would complete their orders. As a result, PKU Beijing 2009 made a series of suggestions on how regulators, companies and the community might work together to enable exciting science whilst minimizing associated risks. These suggestions where then forwarded to the relevant authorities in their own country for further consideration.

There is a strong feeling amongst those involved with iGEM, as well as the broader synthetic biology community, that the work we do should be used only for the benefit of humankind. It should not be used to do harm or to make weapons. This understanding has prompted some to think about what the community can do to ensure that this never happens. One important step could be a code or personal declaration that everyone involved (from the organisers, through supervisors and advisors, to team members and even the mascots!) would commit themselves to. Such a code could help ensure that we think about security as something that does directly involve us, is part of our project and can be dealt with in a way that helps us to get on and have some fun engineering biology.

There is an international treaty that prohibits the use of biology for hostile or malign purposes. If you intend to use biology to do harm you will be breaking international law.

Many countries also have their own laws about using biology in this way. They are increasingly backed up with regulations and guidelines that are relevant to the day to day functioning of a laboratory. It is important that we are all familiar with the rules that cover our work. Whilst we are commonly taught how we should work safely, we are less often taught how to work securely.

This section provides a gateway to details of some of these national regulatory frameworks. We hoping that you will use this to make sure you know all you need to know about staying out of trouble. But we are hoping that you will also be able to help us improve this resource. We have provided some information on some of the measures in some of the countries with the largest participation in iGEM. We know this is not a list of all relevant measures in all countries that participate. Here is where you come in. Is there something missing you know applies in your country? If so why not add some information? If you don't know what is in place, why not find out and let us know? That would really help future teams, your professional conduct and the community as a whole.

• Laws in China relevant to work with biological agents

• Laws in Switzerland relevant to work with biological agents
• Swiss arrangements for biosafety and biosecurity
• Swiss arrangements for the oversight of science

• Laws in the UK relevant to work with biological agents
• UK arrangements for biosafety and biosecurity

• Laws in the US relevant to work with biological agents
• US arrangements for biosafety and biosecurity
• US arrangements for the oversight of science

• Other national and international regulations
• Recent discussions about codes

If there is anything here that has caught your interest, infuriated you and sparked any other reason you would like to get in touch, then please do. You can leave comments, thoughts and suggestions below but also feel free to contact us directly if you want something a little more interactive.