Team:Lyon-INSA-ENS/Safety/Suggestions
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- | <a href="https://static.igem.org/mediawiki/2011/ | + | <a href="https://static.igem.org/mediawiki/2011/3/38/Cobalt_BusterSAFETY.pdf"><img src="https://static.igem.org/mediawiki/2011/6/64/Fileicon-pdf.png" style="width:25px";/> Download the complete version of our Safety part</a><br> |
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- | From the debate <B>“Nuclear technology and Genetically Modified Organisms : Can scientists keep control?” </B> we | + | From the debate <B>“Nuclear technology and Genetically Modified Organisms : Can scientists keep control?” </B> we organized, several safety issues were risen and suggestions have been proposed to tackle them. |
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First, <b>the standardisation of parts</b> makes it simpler to <b>use and share for researchers</b>, but also <b>for malign or careless uses</b>. All the informations related to the iGEM projects are freely available on the Internet <b>without any access control</b>. It has been evoked that, with these informations, anyone with basic microbiology knowledge could try to build <b>his own bio-weapon</b> (like people nowadays can find the recipe to create their own bomb on the Internet) or, on a safety point of view, could <b>misuse a part and accidentally harm people or environment</b>. | First, <b>the standardisation of parts</b> makes it simpler to <b>use and share for researchers</b>, but also <b>for malign or careless uses</b>. All the informations related to the iGEM projects are freely available on the Internet <b>without any access control</b>. It has been evoked that, with these informations, anyone with basic microbiology knowledge could try to build <b>his own bio-weapon</b> (like people nowadays can find the recipe to create their own bomb on the Internet) or, on a safety point of view, could <b>misuse a part and accidentally harm people or environment</b>. | ||
<i>Yet, would it be a better solution to restrict access to iGEM members ?</i> <br> | <i>Yet, would it be a better solution to restrict access to iGEM members ?</i> <br> | ||
- | It would mean to give up on the valuable “open source” model, where | + | It would mean to give up on the valuable “open source” model, where everyone's experience contributes to enhancing our knowledge, including the knowledge about the safety of the parts (what should and should not be done with a part, what precautions you must take, what unexpected behavior has been observed...). Concealing the information would not prevent people from accessing it illegally, as shown by the numerous web security breaches that are regularly reported. This means that synthetic biology should be careful about safety issues, and discussions or reflections concerning the “open source” should not be overlooked. |
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<p style="line-height:1.5em"> | <p style="line-height:1.5em"> | ||
- | <b>General safety issues about GMOs</b> have also been | + | <b>General safety issues about GMOs</b> have also been mentioned, and the reasons why the general public considers them unsafe. The quick development of plant GMOs was, in the eyes of the general public, a search for immediate profit with few concerns about safety and ethics. And moreover very few efforts of communication have been made, which has created a prejudice about GMOs. We noticed that generally, <b>GM bacteria</b> are widely used in <b>medicine and food industry</b>, but are less known by the public who is less scared about them. Synthetic biology should avoid such a mistake, by communicating to the public before releasing new devices, and ensuring that they will be accepted by a distrust public. |
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<br/><p style="line-height:1.5em"> | <br/><p style="line-height:1.5em"> |
Latest revision as of 13:24, 21 September 2011
For a Safer Genetic Engineering ?
From the debate “Nuclear technology and Genetically Modified Organisms : Can scientists keep control?” we organized, several safety issues were risen and suggestions have been proposed to tackle them.
First, the standardisation of parts makes it simpler to use and share for researchers, but also for malign or careless uses. All the informations related to the iGEM projects are freely available on the Internet without any access control. It has been evoked that, with these informations, anyone with basic microbiology knowledge could try to build his own bio-weapon (like people nowadays can find the recipe to create their own bomb on the Internet) or, on a safety point of view, could misuse a part and accidentally harm people or environment.
Yet, would it be a better solution to restrict access to iGEM members ?
It would mean to give up on the valuable “open source” model, where everyone's experience contributes to enhancing our knowledge, including the knowledge about the safety of the parts (what should and should not be done with a part, what precautions you must take, what unexpected behavior has been observed...). Concealing the information would not prevent people from accessing it illegally, as shown by the numerous web security breaches that are regularly reported. This means that synthetic biology should be careful about safety issues, and discussions or reflections concerning the “open source” should not be overlooked.
General safety issues about GMOs have also been mentioned, and the reasons why the general public considers them unsafe. The quick development of plant GMOs was, in the eyes of the general public, a search for immediate profit with few concerns about safety and ethics. And moreover very few efforts of communication have been made, which has created a prejudice about GMOs. We noticed that generally, GM bacteria are widely used in medicine and food industry, but are less known by the public who is less scared about them. Synthetic biology should avoid such a mistake, by communicating to the public before releasing new devices, and ensuring that they will be accepted by a distrust public.
We are not alone to think about all these considerations. A great debate will occur at the occasion of the European Jamboree in Amsterdam in the aim to define an Oath for Life Scientists.